Reasserting Control Over Territory
The debate over the scope of subregional government powers is, on the one hand, a bargaining strategy designed to force the KDP to acknowledge limits to its power to govern from Erbil rather than a genuine attempt to enhance local government capacity or hold elections.6 Yet the prominence of the issue in the region’s political discourse reflects the increasing importance of reinforcing territorial control as a means to achieve economic and political goals that can no longer be assured through consensus. Accordingly, the KDP and PUK have also taken measures to reinforce their local administrations while boldly co-opting their rivals’ domestic challengers.
The PUK’s greatest challenge in governing Sulaimaniyah has been instilling discipline in its ranks to prevent the rent-seeking behavior of its most powerful members from destroying the party from within. The party’s fourth congress and new leadership thus began the process of subordinating the unwieldy politburo to the Co-Presidency by initiating its own “war on corruption.” This meant transferring regulatory authority over the General Administration (GA), the PUK’s financial regulatory body, from the politburo to the Co-Presidency and the Leadership Council.7 To shore up revenues for the party, the GA began to demand higher dividends from enterprises operating in Sulaimaniyah, many of which are affiliated with politburo members. In a recent example, the GA intervened in an oil transportation workers’ strike against a general contractor in which members of the Germiyan branch held a significant stake. The GA ended the strike by taking over the general contractors’ role, thus asserting the party’s authority to manage local business. Yet not surprisingly, the concentration of financial power in the Co-Presidency and its confrontational leadership style has been controversial and has met with opposition from some once powerful members of the politburo.
While the PUK gets its house in order, the KDP is struggling to keep it together. Long-suppressed popular grievances have erupted in street demonstrations throughout Duhok and Erbil governorates as a result of wage cuts, COVID-19 travel restrictions, and Turkish military incursions. Alarmed by these conspicuous displays of discontent with the once uncontested KDP leadership, PM Masrour Barzani replaced the Duhok governor and several local administrators8 with nominees with experience in the KDP intelligence and asayish (security forces) bureaus and personal loyalty to Masrour Barzani.9 Referred to by interviewees as a “security administration,”10 the character of the new leadership has been reflected in the arrests of dozens of journalists and protest organizers since May 2020 and their arraignment on national security offenses. The recent conviction of five of these defendants on charges that they collaborated with foreign governments (including the United States and Germany) to spy on the KRG was calculated to send a clear message to citizens that insubordination would not be tolerated, but it also reveals the KDP leadership’s growing concern that it is no longer as secure as it once was on its own turf.
With the KRG coalition beset with conflict, the parties also seek allies at the local level. Recently, this has included campaigning for support across
Meanwhile, the new PUK leadership has announced a new strategy to enlarge its base of support in the KDP heartland of Badinan.11 It has also done so more quietly in Soran, a strategically important district bordering Iran and Turkey. For decades before falling under KDP control, it was the no-man’s-land in the most bitter intra-Kurdish warfare and it has since been the site of the Kurdistan Workers Party’s (PKK) Qandil Mountain strongholds. These regions of Duhok and Erbil have some of the highest rates of unemployment and poverty in the KRI and frustration with reduced incomes and more aggressive asayish crackdowns has renewed opportunities for PUK outreach. The inability (or unwillingness) of the KRG to secure its border against the Turkish army’s advance through the border districts of these governorates and the resulting infrastructural neglect and displacement of thousands of villagers has also given the PUK leverage to co-opt elements of the KDP’s tribal network. This has included two of the largest and most important tribes in Erbil and Duhok governorates: the Bradost and the Harkis.
These provocative incursions into rival territory raise the possibility that wars of words between the parties could intensify hostilities on the ground. Last month, the PUK accused KDP intelligence of hatching a plot to poison Agha Jawher Harki and his son in retaliation for their disloyalty. Given that the Harkis have engaged in armed struggles with KDP forces in recent years, such inflammatory claims should not be taken lightly.13 Meanwhile, the KDP’s mobilization against the PKK in Qandil in cooperation with Turkish forces while the PUK reinforces the contested village of Zini Warte14 with an asayish unit recalls the events of the 1990s when the quest for tribal allies and the exploitation of rivalries by invading armies stoked the fires of armed conflict between the Kurdistan Region’s dominant parties.
The Federal and Regional Budgets: Hope for Reconciliation?
Amid the deterioration of partisan relations, there was reason for hope when agreement on the 2021 budget was reached on March 31. In addition to being hailed as a reset for federal-regional relations, it was also greeted as a collective victory for the Kurdish parties — the product of a PUK delegation’s leadership at the negotiating table and the KDP’s back-channeling of the Sadrists.15 Significantly, the deal recognizes Kurdish development and exports of oil and gas and the region’s receipt of its full share of the budget from the federal government, after the deduction of the value of 250,000 barrels per day (bpd) in exports at prices set by Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) and 50% of non-oil revenues. PM Masrour Barzani expressed hope that the restoration of federal transfers to the KRG would “pave the way for a recovery from the era of difficult economic challenges in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region” with the support of Kurdish blocs. Until 2014, federal cash transfers to the region promoted intra-Kurdish consensus by minimizing partisan competition for local sources of income. In 2019, decentralization demands were shelved after salary payments to civil servants resumed. However, the recent budget law has not had the pacifying effect of past agreements.
First, the 2021 budget law will not resolve the region’s economic crisis or remedy the financial contributors to escalating party conflict. Even if delivered regularly and in full, the KRG’s share of the budget will not come close to covering its multibillion-dollar deficit, full public salary and pension payments,16 or the significant infrastructure investments the government has promised. In addition, while the proceeds from the export of oil may help the KRG pay debts to international oil companies (IOCs), they are unlikely to meet the additional costs of oil export infrastructure and obligations for forward oil sales, as KRG exports face additional fees for exports to Turkey and thus receives less oil revenues.17 There also remains a possibility that KRI’s share will not be delivered timely or consistently as Shi’a blocs in parliament seek an abrogation of an agreement reached in mid-June that provided for backdating the KRI’s allocation to January 2021. Therefore, the KRG must continue to make drastic cuts to public spending. This will almost certainly mean the continuation of hiring freezes and 21% cuts to government employee salaries,18 pensions, and benefits just to avoid defaulting on its $27 billion in debts.
Yet salary cuts are a politically explosive issue as the Kurdistan Region’s Council of Ministers drafts the region’s first budget since 2013. Notwithstanding demands from civil servants for full salary payments and the resumption of government recruitment, the KRG will be faced with a choice between paying its employees and paying its IOC creditors. In 2019, it delayed distributions to government workers despite regular transfers from Baghdad. In July 2020, the PUK threatened to withdraw its representation from the government and parliament when the Council of Ministers decided to reintroduce19 salary reductions. After the passage of the budget law, it promised constituents that the government would pay salaries in full. The KDP, has promised far less and has warned that federal budget payments do not “100% guarantee” that salaries will be paid in full. Meanwhile, aware that its dominant position in the cabinet puts it in the firing line of public ire with the inevitable continuation of salary reductions, it attempts to shift the burden by reminding the PUK and Gorran of their complicity in the mismanagement of public funds and economic policy that has deepened the financial crisis. There is much at stake if the KRG defaults on its obligations to the public: both parties are concerned about the re-emergence of the violent protests that occurred throughout the region in the summer and winter of 2020 from Zakho to Sulaimaniyah as a result of the region’s inability to pay its civil servants, especially ahead of October’s general elections. Anticipating that the government will not be able to fulfill its obligations, each party now accuses the other of failing to disclose or withholding income derived from local sources such as taxes and customs revenues from the KRG treasury and thereby causing ongoing delays in salary distributions.
Second, the provision requiring the KRG to share non-oil revenues, which constituted an estimated 16% of the region’s total income in 2020,20 will place additional pressure on the KRG to crack down on the uncontrolled smuggling and embezzlement at the borders to ensure an accurate accounting of revenues owed to Baghdad. However, anti-corruption measures are controversial and difficult to implement because they interfere with the parties’ expectation of local autonomy.21 Accordingly, the PUK has denounced as prejudicial the focus of government anti-corruption investigations into the Perwezkhan and Bashmakh points of entry, both located in the PUK zone of influence, because Ibrahim Khalil and Faysh Khabour in the KDP-controlled governorate of Duhok have largely avoided government scrutiny.22 The PUK has also sought to prevent the disclosure of information on smuggling at Perwezkhan and Bashmakh, namely by lifting the immunity of two sitting MPs in response to a defamation complaint filed by the director of the Bashmakh crossing and transferring a judge overseeing a Perwezkhan corruption case. In January 2021, the KRG tasked the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs to form a joint force to police the border crossings.23 However, lingering distrust between the parties has delayed the deployment of these units.
Finally, the budget’s implicit recognition of Kurdish oil and gas development and export, the law’s most significant concession to the KRG, disproportionately benefits the KDP, which has the effective power to contract with IOCs through the Ministry of Natural Resources. Most of the region’s oil fields and all of its refineries are located within the KDP-controlled provinces, meaning that KDP-owned enterprises reap most of the profit from the region’s energy sector. This places the PUK at a relative disadvantage to benefit from direct exports and other ancillary services. However, while this state of affairs is often cited as a pretext for seeking greater autonomy, it also promotes dependency on the KDP because Sulaimaniyah’s oil and gas production must be transported by truck to Erbil to be refined and exported.24